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Background. Schizophrenia patients show disturbances on a range of tasks that assess mentalizing or 'Theory of 
Mind' (ToM). However, these tasks are often developmentally inappropriate, make large demands on verbal abilities 
and explicit problem-solving skills, and involve after-the-fact reflection as opposed to spontaneous mentalizing. 
Method. To address these limitations, 55 clinically stable schizophrenia out-patients and 44 healthy controls 
completed a validated Animations Task designed to assess spontaneous attributions of social meaning to ambiguous 
abstract visual stimuli. In this paradigm, 12 animations depict two geometric shapes' interacting' with each other in 
three conditions: (1) ToM interactions that elicit attributions of mental states to the agents, (2) Goal-Directed (GO) 
interactions that elicit attributions of simple actions, and (3) Random scenes in which no interaction occurs. Verbal 
descriptions of each animation are rated for the degree of Intentionality attributed to the agents and for accuracy. 
Results. Patients had lower Intentionality ratings than controls for ToM and GO scenes but the groups did not 
significantly differ for Random scenes. The descriptions of the patients less closely matched the situations intended 
by the developers of the task. Within the schizophrenia group, performance on the Animations Task showed minimal 
associations with clinical symptoms. 
Conclusions. Patients demonstrated disturbances in the spontaneous attribution of mental states to abstract visual 
stimuli that normally evoke such attributions. Hence, in addition to previously established impairment on 
mentalizing tasks that require logical inferences about others' mental states, individuals with schizophrenia show 
disturbances in implicit aspects of menta Ii zing. 
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Introduction 
Rapidly growing evidence indicates that individuals 
with schizophrenia show disturbances in the domain 
of social cognition (Green et al. 2005; Penn et al. 2006). 
One aspect of social cognition that has received a great 
deal of research and theoretical attention is mentaliz-
ing or 'Theory of Mind' (ToM). Mentalizing is a mul-
tifaceted construct that typically refers to the capacity 
to ascribe distinct mental states to oneself and others, 
and to make correct inferences about the content of 
those mental states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Frith 
& Frith, 2003; Leslie et al. 2004). Mentalizing involves 
processes at a number of levels, from relatively auto-
matic perceptual processes, such as biological motion 
perception, to higher-level conceptual processes, such 
as understanding others' intentions and emotions 
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(Leslie, 1994; Blakemore & Decety, 2001). It is theor-
ized to reflect an evolved psychological capacity that 
facilitates effective social communication and inter-
personal functioning (Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 1998; 
Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006; Burns, 2006). 
Recent reviews document performance deficits in 
schizophrenia patients on a diverse range of tasks 
(Brune, 2005; Harrington et al. 2005). Some studies in-
dicate that patients perform poorly on the classic false-
belief tests (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983) that use short 
stories with or without accompanying props to assess 
understanding of basic first-order beliefs (i.e. that 
someone can hold a false belief about a state of the 
world) or more complex second-order beliefs (i.e. that 
someone can have a false belief about the belief of 
another person). Patients also show deficits on tasks 
that involve arranging cartoon panels into coherent 
stories based on the characters' mental states, and on 
tasks that use written vignettes to assess detection 
of deception, hints or sarcasm (see Brune, 2005; 
Harrington et aI. 2005). These impairments appear to 
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have functional and clinical relevance, as they show 
significant associations with patients' actual com-
munity functioning (Couture et al. 2006). In addition, 
mentalizing disturbances have been proposed to 
underlie particular symptoms (Frith, 1992, 2004; 
Corcoran et al. 1995). In his influential theory, Frith 
proposed that patients with negative symptoms may 
never have developed an adequate ability to mental-
ize, those with thought disorder and certain positive 
symptoms possess a mentalizing capacity but use it in 
a faulty manner (e.g. hyper-mentalizing associated 
with paranoid delusions), and those with passivity 
experiences (e.g. delusions of control) or in remission 
may have spared ToM. Although some studies sup-
port these hypothesized associations, the results have 
been inconsistent (see Brune, 2005; Harrington et al. 
2005). 
Although schizophrenia patients show disturb-
ances across a range of mentalizing tasks, several 
methodological features of commonly used paradigms 
may limit their ability to validly assess this broad 
construct. First, many of these tasks were designed for 
use in studies of normal or abnormal (particularly 
in the context of autism) child development, using 
stimuli that are developmentally inappropriate for 
adults with schizophrenia. A related concern is that 
these brief tasks often use categorical' all-or-none' 
scoring formats that limit their ability to detect more 
fine-grained quantitative individual differences (Klin, 
2000). Second, tasks that use written social vignettes 
make considerable demands on cognitive processes 
such as verbal ability and memory, which are known 
to be disrupted in schizophrenia (Nuechterlein et al. 
2004). The use of explicit verbal stimuli might serve to 
artificially enhance mentalizing task performance by 
facilitating language-based strategies for generating 
solutions to problems concerning others' mental states 
(Klin, 2000). 
Third, standard ToM tasks do not capture spon-
taneous mentalizing as it typically occurs in the course 
of daily life (Frith, 2004). The ToM tasks described 
above require subjects to make reflective, logical in-
ferences about others' mental states in clearly defined 
social problem-solving situations, which has been 
described as explicit mentalizing (Frith, 2004). How-
ever, social interactions are typically ambiguous and 
dynamic, and successfully navigating them relies on 
an ability to rapidly apprehend others' fluctuating 
intentions and emotions from contextual cues (Klin, 
2000). Much of this ongoing processing appears to 
occur in a largely automatic, non-reflective manner 
that is not captured by explicit mentalizing tasks (Frith 
& Frith, 2003; German et al. 2004; Spiers & Maguire, 
2006; Lieberman, 2007). This process has been 
described as implicit mentalizing (Frith, 2004) and 
assessed using a variety of behavioral, physiological 
and neuroimaging paradigms that expose subjects to 
socially relevant cues (Puce & Perrett, 2005; Frith & 
Frith, 2006). The perceptual cues that spontaneously 
trigger attributions of agency and associated patterns 
of neural activation can be quite impoverished, 
including simple motion patterns displayed by non-
human figures (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Heberlein & 
Adolphs, 2004). In a recent elaboration of his theory, 
Frith (2004) speculated that although schizophrenia 
patients show explicit mentalizing impairments, their 
use of implicit mentalizing is probably intact. 
The current study sought to address these meth-
odological issues by examining the performance of 
schizophrenia patients on an Animations Task de-
signed to assess implicit aspects of mentalizing across 
diverse age groups (Abell et al. 2000; Castelli et al. 
2000,2002). In this paradigm, subjects watch a series of 
videos depicting geometric figures that move about in 
Random, Goal-Directed (GD), or Theory of Mind 
(ToM) movement conditions and provide open-ended 
descriptions after each video. This paradigm was in-
spired by Heider & Simmel's (1944) classic studies of 
social attribution in healthy adults, in which a silent 
video that depicted geometric shapes moving in a 
contingent fashion almost invariably elicited anthro-
pomorphic descriptions, such as intentions, person-
ality traits, and emotions. The validity of this and 
similar paradigms is supported by studies indicating 
that: (1) these socially impoverished stimuli trigger 
automatic attributions of agency and mentalizing in 
healthy adults and children across different cultures 
(Hashimoto, 1966; Marek, 1966; Berry et al. 1992; Berry 
& Springer, 1993; Abell et al. 2000; Castelli et al. 2000), 
(2) the task activates a putative mentalizing neural 
network in healthy subjects (Blakemore & Decety, 
2001; Frith & Frith, 2003), and (3) the social interpret-
ation of the stimuli, and corresponding brain activity, 
is substantially reduced in children and adults with 
autism or Asperger's syndrome (Abell et al. 2000; 
Bowler & Thommen, 2000; Castelli et al. 2000; Klin, 
2000; Klin & Jones, 2006). 
The animations used in the current study have 
been used in one prior study of schizophrenia. Russell 
et al. (2006) administered the task to a sample of pre-
dominantly in-patients with clinical diagnoses of 
schizophrenia using the original task administration 
and scoring procedures (Abell et al. 2000). At the be-
ginning of the task, subjects were instructed that they 
were going to see animations showing' an interaction 
with feelings and thoughts', 'a simple interaction' 
or a 'random movement'. A title was provided for 
each upcoming scene that provided a cue about the 
intended content (e.g. ToM animations were given 
human titles such as 'a grandmother and grandson' 
and the GD animations were given animal titles). 
Mentalizing was scored using a categorical approach, 
with each response categorized as using action, inter-
action, or mental state attribution terms. Compared to 
healthy controls, patients were less likely to use men-
talizing terms to describe ToM scenes and generally 
showed lower levels of accuracy. Symptom-based 
subgroup analyses indicated that disturbances were 
most apparent in patients with negative symptoms, 
thought disorder and paranoia, as compared to those 
with passivity symptoms (e.g. delusions of control) or 
in remission. 
The current study evaluated whether well-charac-
terized schizophrenia out-patients demonstrate spon-
taneous mentalizing impairments using modified 
Animations Task administration and scoring pro-
cedures (Castelli et al. 2000, 2002). The modified ad-
ministration procedure did not provide explicit cues 
about the nature of the task or scene contents. In ad-
dition, Intentionality ratings are based on a continuous 
scale that may more sensitively capture individual 
differences. 
The primary prediction was that patients would 
demonstrate less intentionality and accuracy than 
controls in their descriptions for the ToM animations 
but not for the Random animations. We did not have 
strong predications about group differences for the 
less complex GD condition. However, some studies 
suggest that patients with particular symptoms, such 
as paranoid or disorganized symptoms, show im-
paired visual perception of causality or contingent 




Participants included 55 schizophrenia out-patients 
and 44 non-patient controls. Patients met criteria for 
schizophrenia based on the Structured Clinical Inter-
view for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al. 1996). Diagnostic 
interviewers were trained to a minimum K of 0.75 for 
rating psychotic and mood symptoms by the Treat-
ment Unit of the Department of Veterans Affairs VISN 
22 Mental Illness Research Education and Clinical 
Center (MIRECC). All patients were receiving anti-
psychotic medications at clinically determined dos-
ages (n = 47 for atypical only; n = 3 for typical only; 
11 =4 for both). Non-patient controls were recruited 
through newspaper advertisements and flyers posted 
in the local community. Controls were screened 
with the SCID and SCID-II (First et al. 1994) and were 
excluded if they met criteria for any psychotic dis-
order, bipolar mood disorder, recurrent depression, 
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substance dependence, or paranoid, schizotypal, 
schizoid, avoidant or borderline personality disorder. 
Controls were also excluded if there was any evidence 
(according to participant report) of a history of psy-
chotic disorder among their first-degree relatives. 
Additional exclusion criteria for all subjects included 
age < 8 or > 55 years, active substance use disorder in 
the past 6 months, identifiable neurological disorder, 
mental retardation, or seizure disorder. 
Clinical ratings 
Brief Psychiatric Ratillg Scale (BPRS) 
For all patients, psychiatric symptoms during the 
previous month were rated using the expanded 24-
item UCLA version of the BPRS (Overall & Gorham, 
1962; Lukoff et al. 1986) by a trained rater. BPRS raters 
achieved a median intra-class correlation coefficient 
(ICC) of 0.80 or higher across all items compared with 
the criterion ratings (Ventura et al. 1993). From this 
version of the BPRS, five empirically derived subscales 
scores [based on the mean of items comprising the 
scale (possible range 1-7); Guy, 1976] and a 24-item 
total score were derived. 
Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) 
Negative symptoms during the preceding month were 
evaluated using the SANS (Andreasen, 1984). Four 
SANS global scales were used in the current study: 
Affective flattening, Alogia, Anhedonia-Asociality, 
and Avolition-Apathy. The Attention scale was not in-
cluded, given findings suggesting that it is not con-
ceptually related to the negative symptom construct 
(Blanchard & Cohen, 2006). 
Measures 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WT AR; Wechsler, 2001) 
The WT AR is a task of general word knowledge that is 
frequently used as an estimate of pre-morbid verbal 
ability. Participants are handed a written list of 50 
words and are asked to read aloud all of the words to 
the best of their ability. A total score is calculated from 
the number of correctly pronounced words. 
Animations task 
Materials. Twelve silent animations, lasting 34-45 s 
each, were presented on a computer screen using 
Quicktime software. All featured a big red triangle 
and a small blue triangle, moving about on a white 
background (see details in Castelli et al. 2000). The 
stimulus parameters of movement change were equa-
ted across conditions. 
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Procedure. Administration procedures followed those 
described by Castelli et al. (2002). Subjects were told 
that the task was designed to learn about how people 
perceive movement. They were informed that they 
would be shown a series of animations and that 
they would be asked to provide a description of 
how they perceived or interpreted the movements 
after each animation. Two practice animations were 
administered to familiarize subjects with the task and 
to ensure that they comprehended the instructions. 
A total of 12 animations were shown: four anima-
tions for each of the three different conditions. The 
stimuli were presented in an intermixed, random or-
der. The scripts (i.e. type of interaction intended by the 
developers of the task) underlying the ToM interac-
tions involved one agent coaxing, seducing, mocking 
or surprising another. The CD and Random conditions 
serve as control conditions that also involve triangles 
moving in a self-propelled manner, but do not depict 
interactions that involve complex mental states. The 
scripts underlying the four CD interactions involved 
one agent chasing, fighting, dancing or leading 
another. In the Random animations the triangles 
moved in a non-interactive, non-contingent manner. 
After each scene, the experimenter always asked the 
same neutral question: 'What was happening in this 
animation?' On no occasion was feedback given, but 
subjects were generally praised for their descriptions. 
All responses were digitally recorded and transcribed 
for scoring. 
Scoring. Full scoring details and examples of responses 
are provided in Castelli et al. (2000). In brief, the verbal 
descriptions given after each animation were coded 
along two different dimensions: (1) 'Appropriate-
ness': how accurately the descriptions capture the 
events depicted in the animations, as intended by 
the underlying scripts; and (2) 'Intentionality': the 
degree to which purposeful movements and mental 
states are described. In addition, the Length of each 
narrative was calculated using a word count. The 
Appropriateness score is based on the following 0-3 
scale: 0 =' don't know' responses; 1 = focuses solely 
on a minor aspect of the animation; 2=partial de-
scription; 3 = fully correct description. 
The Intentionality score reflects the degree to which 
the subject describes complex, intentional mental 
states. This rating is made based on the selection of 
verbs in the narratives (i.e. verbs that conveyed inter-
nal mental states were scored higher). It was rated in-
dependently of whether the verb correctly matched 
the underlying script. Thus, a particular description 
can be rated high on Intentionality but relatively 
low on Appropriateness. The degree of Intentionality 
is rated on a 0-5 scale: 0 = non-purposeful action 
(e.g. 'they are just bouncing around '); 1 = purposeful 
action without another (e.g. 'they are swimming in 
circles '); 2 = purposeful action with another (e.g. 'the 
blue one is copying the red one'); 3=goal-directed 
intention (e.g. 'the blue one is trying to get away from 
the red one '); 4 = attribution of mental states during 
reciprocal interaction (e.g. 'the red one is feeling upset 
by what the other one did '); 5 = one agent intention-
ally affecting or manipulating the mental state of 
another agent (e.g. 'the red triangle is tricking the 
blue triangle to embarrass it'). 
Prior to scoring the transcripts, three raters were 
trained by one of us (F.e), who developed the scoring 
system and co-rated a set of practice transcripts 
with the raters. Each transcript was independently 
rated by all three raters, who were blind to group 
membership. ICCs were excellent for ratings of Ap-
propriateness (ToM=0.97, CD =0.93, Random=0.98) 
and Intentionality (ToM =0.96, CD =0.97, Random= 
0.94). Consensus ratings for each item were used in the 
data analyses. 
Data analysis 
Croup differences in participant characteristics were 
evaluated with paired t tests for continuous variables 
and X2 tests for categorical variables. For the primary 
analyses, group differences on the Animations Task 
were evaluated using 2 (group) x 3 (condition: ToM, 
CD, Random) repeated-measures ANOVAs for three 
dependent measures: Intentionality, Appropriateness, 
and number of words. Associations between task per-
formance and clinical symptoms were evaluated with 
Pearson correlation coefficients. All statistical tests are 
two-tailed, using a significance level of p < 0.05. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
Preliminary analyses evaluated correlations be-
tween Appropriateness and Intentionality ratings. The 
strength and direction of the correlations differed sub-
stantially across the Random (patients = - 0.85, con-
trols = - 0.90), CD (patients = 0.31, controls = 0.20), and 
ToM (patients = 0.85, controls = 0.69) conditions. In 
the Random condition, relatively high Intentionality 
ratings indicate a tendency to hyper-mentalize (under-
mentalizing is not possible) and are strongly linked 
to describing the intended meaning of the scenes 
inappropriately. By contrast, relatively low Inten-
tionality ratings in the ToM condition indicate under-
mentalizing (hyper-mentalizing is not possible) and 
are strongly linked to describing the intended meaning 
of the scenes inappropriately. Thus, the pattern of 
relationships across conditions is expected. 
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Table 1. Participant characteristics for schizophrenia (n = 55) and control (n =44) groups 
Characteristic Schizophrenia Control 
Age, mean (S.D.) 40.1 (10.S) 39.7 (9.1) 
Sex (%) 
Male 76 74 
Female 24 24 
Ethnicity (%) 
Caucasian 35 41 
African American 29 36 
Hispanic 23 15 
Asian S 3 
Other 6 5 
Marital status (%) 
Never married 70 60 
Currently married 5 7 
Ever married 25 33 
Education, mean (S.D.) 13.1 (1.9) 13.0 (1.0) 
Parental education, 14.4 (3.1) 13.9 (2.3) 
mean (S.D.) 
Wechsler Test of Adult 30.4 (9.S) 35.4 (S.7) 
Reading, mean (S.D.) 
S.D., Standard deviation. 
* p <0.01. 
Participant characteristics 
As shown in Table 1, the groups did not significantly 
differ on age, sex, ethnicity, marital status, education, 
or parental education. WTAR scores were significantly 
lower in patients than controls [t(97) = 2.59, P < 0.01], 
indicating lower estimated verbal abilities in the 
patient group. Consequently, the primary analyses 
were conducted both without and with WT AR scores 
included as a covariate. 
This out-patient schizophrenia sample had gener-
ally mild levels of symptoms. Mean ratings on the 
BPRS subscales were: 1.7 (S.D. = 0.6) for Anergia, 2.4 
(S.D. = 0.8) for Anxiety/Depression, 2.5 (S.D. = 1.2) for 
Thought Disturbance, 1.2 (S.D. =0.3) for Activation and 
2.0 (S.D. = 0.8) for Hostile Suspiciousness. The mean 
BPRS Total score (based on the sum of the 24 BPRS 
items) was 44.0 (S.D. = 9.7). Mean scores on the SANS 
were: 1.8 (S.D. = 1.3) for Affective flattening, 0.8 (S.D. = 
1.0) for Alogia, 2.9 (S.D. = 1.2) for Apathy / Avolition 
and 2.5 (S.D. = 1.2) for Anhedonia/ Asociality. Patients 
had a mean age of onset of 22.1 years (S.D. = 6.2) and a 
mean duration of illness of 17.4 years (S.D. =9.3). 
Performance on the Animations Task 
Descriptive statistics for the Animations Task are 
presented in Table 2. For Intentionality ratings, there 
were significant effects for condition [F(2, 97) = 325.25, 
Statistics 
t(97) =0.04 
X2(1, n =9S) =0.01 




t(97) = 2.59* 
Table 2. Ratings of participants' descriptions on the 
Animations Task 
Scale ToM GD 
Intentionality 
Schizophrenia 3.1 (0.9) 2.2 (0.6) 
Control 3.7 (0.7) 2.4 (0.5) 
Appropriateness 
Schizophrenia l.S (0.5) 2.3 (0.5) 
Control 2.1 (0.4) 2.5 (0.4) 
Length 
Schizophrenia 56.7 (34.S) 3S.1 (24.S) 
Control 62.4 (36.4) 43.1 (35.2) 
ToM, Theory of Mind; GD, Goal-Directed. 








P <0.001] and group [F(2, 97) =5.87, p <0.05] as well as 
for the condition x group interaction [F(2, 97) = 5.98, 
P < 0.005]. These effects remained significant when 
WTAR scores were included as a covariate. Within the 
control group, Intentionality ratings were higher for 
ToM scenes than for CD scenes [t( 43) = 13.11, P < 0.001], 
which were in turn higher than Random scenes [t(43) = 
10.59, p<O.OOl], supporting the validity of this para-
digm. Similarly, within the patient group, Inten-
tionality ratings were higher for ToM scenes than for 
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CD scenes [t(45) =10.47, p<O.OOl, which were in turn 
higher than Random scenes [t(45) =9.66, P <0.001]. 
As predicted, the groups did not differ significantly 
on Intentionality ratings for the Random condition 
[t(97) = 0.02, P > 0.05] and patients had lower Inten-
tionality ratings than controls for ToM anima-
tions [t(97) = 3.75, P <0.001]. Patients also had lower 
ratings than controls for CD animations [t(97) = 2.23, 
P < 0.05]. To determine whether the group difference 
on the ToM condition was significantly larger than 
that on the CD condition, a follow-up 2 (group) x 2 
(condition: CD v. ToM) ANOVA was conducted. This 
analysis revealed a significant interaction [F(1, 97) = 
5.63, P < 0.05], indicating that the between-group dif-
ference for ToM animations (d = 0.76) was significantly 
larger than for CD animations (d = 0.48). 
For Appropriateness ratings, there were significant 
effects for condition [F(2,97) =21.84, p<O.OOl] and 
group [F(2, 97) = 8.45, p < 0.005] but not for the con-
dition x group interaction [F(2, 97) =0.18, p > 0.05]. The 
condition and group effects remained significant when 
WT AR scores were included as a covariate. Patients 
had generally lower Appropriateness ratings than 
controls across conditions. Irrespective of group, 
Appropriateness ratings were significantly lower for 
the ToM condition compared to the CD (t=7.19, 
p<O.OOl) and Random conditions (t=5.00, p<O.OOl), 
which did not differ significantly from each other 
(t=0.84, p>0.05), (all df=97). 
For the Length of the narratives, there was a sig-
nificant condition effect [F(2, 97) = 62.98, P < 0.001]. 
Importantly, the groups did not differ significantly on 
Length [F(2, 97) =0.63, p>0.05] and the condition x 
group interaction [F(2, 97) = 0.54, P > 0.05] was also 
non-significant. This pattern was not altered by in-
cluding WT AR scores as a covariate. Across the 
groups, descriptions for ToM scenes were longer than 
the CD scenes [t(97) = 10.77, P < 0.001], which were 
in tum longer than the Random scenes [t(97) = 2.10, 
p<0.05]. 
Associations with clinical symptoms within the 
patient group 
For clinical symptoms rated on the BPRS, there were 
no significant correlations or notable trends between 
the five subscales or total scores on the one hand, 
and Intentionality or Appropriateness scores on the 
other (all r's < 0.20). To further evaluate associations 
between the Animations Task and symptoms, we 
computed indices from the BPRS items that corre-
spond to the major symptom domains described by 
Liddle (1999): Psychomotor Poverty, Conceptual Dis-
organization, and Reality Distortion. We also evalu-
ated associations with the individual BPRS Paranoia 
item. None of these correlations were significant (all 
r's <0.20). 
Looking at negative symptoms as rated by the 
SANS, most of the correlations with performance were 
non-significant, but a few reached significance for the 
Random scenes. Higher Apathy / Amotivation corre-
lated with higher Intentionality (r = 0.35, P < 0.05) and 
lower Appropriateness (r = - 0.32, P < 0.05) ratings. 
Similarly, higher Anhedonia/ Asociality correlated 
with higher Intentionality (r = 0.39, P < 0.01) and lower 
Appropriateness (r = - 0.30, P < 0.05) ratings. Associ-
ations with these negative symptoms all remained 
significant when WTAR scores were entered into 
partial correlations (all p's <0.05). No correlations 
were significant for ToM or CD scenes or for Affective 
Flattening and Alogia (all r's <0.20). Performance on 
the Animations Task also showed no significant associ-
ations with age of onset or duration of illness (r's 
<0.20). 
Discussion 
Most prior studies of mentalizing in schizophrenia 
used verbal vignettes or social cartoon stimuli to as-
sess whether patients can make rational inferences 
about the mental states of others in explicitly defined 
social situations. The current study focused on a dif-
ferent component of mentalizing, namely the capacity 
to spontaneously attribute social meaning to ambigu-
ous visual stimuli. Although Frith (2004) speculated 
that the mentalizing impairments of schizophrenia 
patients are limited to explicit tasks, the current find-
ings suggest that their impairments extend to implicit 
aspects of mentalizing as well. 
As predicted, schizophrenia patients had lower 
Intentionality ratings than controls for ToM anima-
tions, but did not differ significantly for the Random 
control condition. The patients also had lower In-
tentionality ratings than controls for CD animations, 
although the magnitude of this difference was signifi-
cantly smaller than for the ToM animations. These 
findings indicate that patients were less likely to at-
tribute social meaning to animations depicting com-
plex interactions at a mental state level, as well as less 
complex interactions depicting contingent, purposeful 
movement. Patients also received generally lower 
Appropriateness ratings than controls across con-
ditions, indicating that their narratives less accurately 
described the underlying scripts of the Animations. 
The group differences were not simply attributable to 
overall amount of verbal output or level of verbal 
ability, as the lengths of the narratives did not differ 
significantly between groups and the differences per-
sisted when estimated verbal ability was accounted for 
in the analyses. 
The current results are largely consistent with those 
of the recent study by Russell et al. (2006). Follow-
ing different administration and scoring procedures, 
Russell and colleagues also found that schizophrenia 
patients less frequently used mental state attribution 
terms for ToM scenes and were generally less accurate 
in describing the underlying scripts of the animations 
than controls. The current study replicated these 
findings using alternative administration and scoring 
procedures in which explicit task instructions and ex-
plicit cues for each scene were not provided. The con-
sistency of findings suggests that the impairment 
shown by schizophrenia patients is observable when 
subjects are provided with cues about context (as in 
Russell et al. 2006) and also when they are not cued 
and responses are spontaneous (as in the current 
study). 
A difference between our results and those of 
Russell et al. (2006) concerns the general lack of as-
sociations between clinical symptoms and mentalizing 
in the current study. The few medium correlations that 
were found between higher negative symptoms and 
higher Intentionality ratings in the Random condition 
are inconsistent with findings by Russell et al. (2006) 
and run counter to Frith's theoretical model (1992, 
2004). Frith linked this type of hyper-mentalizing (i.e. 
attributing higher levels of Intentionality than are 
contextually appropriate) to symptoms such as para-
noia and disorganization. Discrepancies across studies 
could partly reflect the fact that Russell et al. evaluated 
a predominantly in-patient sample that probably dis-
played a greater range of symptoms than our stabil-
ized out-patient sample. Another difference is that we 
used a dimensional approach to evaluate symptoms 
whereas Russell et al. categorized patients into sub-
groups. These discrepancies fit with the larger litera-
ture on mentalizing in schizophrenia, in which 
theoretically predicted relationships to particular 
symptoms have been reported about as frequently as 
not (Harrington et al. 2005). 
It is noteworthy that the schizophrenia patients' 
overall pattern of performance is somewhat distinctive 
compared to individuals with autism spectrum dis-
orders. Using the same version of the Animations 
Task, Castelli et al. (2002) found that adults with 
high-functioning autism or Asperger's disorder dem-
onstrated lower Intentionality and Appropriateness 
ratings than controls only during the ToM scenes. 
Intact perception of GD motion in adults and children 
with autism was also found in a subsequent study that 
used a novel paradigm to directly assess this arguably 
'lower' level of mentalizing (Castelli, 2005). By con-
trast, we found Intentionality differences between 
patients and controls that were large in the ToM 
condition and medium in the GD condition, as well 
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as generally lower Appropriateness. The group dif-
ference in the GD condition is consistent with a few 
other studies showing relatively low-level agency de-
tection abnormalities in schizophrenia patients using 
paradigms that involve perceiving contingent move-
ment or biological motion from simple abstract 
figures (Blakemore et al. 2003; Kim et al. 2005). Thus, 
schizophrenia appears to be characterized by a more 
pervasive pattern of mentalizing disturbances than 
autism spectrum disorders. 
Although the Animations Task has some ad-
vantages over other commonly used mentalizing 
paradigms, this study has some limitations. First, 
although the stimulus materials in this task are non-
verbal and relatively brief, the response format makes 
non-trivial verbal and cognitive demands that could 
adversely impact the schizophrenia patients' per-
formance. Second, although the results were not 
strongly associated with quantity of verbal output or 
the lower general verbal abilities in this schizophrenia 
group, the study did not include a broad neurocogni-
tive battery to assess relationships with other pro-
cesses. Third, the cross-sectional design does not 
permit an assessment of whether the current findings 
reflect trait- or state-related phenomena, although the 
lack of significant associations with symptoms in this 
community-dwelling out-patient sample suggests that 
the findings were not strongly impacted by acute 
clinical symptoms (see also Herold et al. 2002). Fourth, 
patients were chronically ill and medicated. Although 
performance was not significantly related to age of 
onset or duration of illness, studies of samples that 
are early in the course of illness, unmedicated, or 
randomly assigned to receive different types of anti-
psychotic medications will be required to directly ad-
dress chronicity and medication effects. 
Although implicit social cognitive processes are 
widely believed to playa key role in adaptive func-
tioning (Bargh & Williams, 2006; Lieberman, 2007), 
implicit aspects of social cognition have received 
limited attention in studies of functional outcome 
in schizophrenia. It will be useful in future research 
to determine whether implicit social cognitive pro-
cesses explain the large portion of variance in the 
social functioning of individuals with schizophrenia 
that is not explained by explicit social and non-
social cognitive tasks (Green et al. 2000; Couture 
et al. 2006). In addition, social cognitive neuroscientists 
have developed a variety of neuroimaging paradigms 
to assess implicit aspects of mentalizing and other 
social cognitive processes (e.g. Frith & Frith, 2006; 
Lieberman, 2007), which provides a rich founda-
tion for translational research into the neural corre-
lates of schizophrenia patients' disturbances in these 
areas. 
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